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Bills of Aftainder and the Supreme Court in 1960
-Flemming v. Nestor
INTRODUCTION
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judi-
ciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may be justly
pronounced the very definition of tyranny."
This statement by James Madison at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution is descriptive of the reasons which underlie the
doctrine of separation of powers inherent in the American tripartite
system of government. Partiality and prejudice can occur under
any system. Separation of legislative and judicial power minimizes
the incidence of official prejudice by preventing the same body from
simultaneously legislating and adjudicating.2 The theory is based on
the proposition that men should be judged by general and prospective
rules. American legal tradition prohibits condemnation until the
accused has been given an opportunity to be heard in a court of
justice.3 Inescapably opposed to this ideology are laws by which a
legislature imposes a penalty on named persons it declares guilty of
some described offense. Such enactments-bills of attainder-are
substitutions of the legislative will for the judicial processes, 4 and
are forbidden to both Federal and state governments by the United
States Constitution.5
As a result of the broad sweep of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments the prohibition has been infrequently argued to the Supreme
Court since first being used shortly after the Civil War." However, in
the recent hearing of Flemming v. Nestor7 the proscription against
bills of attainder was urged against an act of Congress 8 resulting in
1. The Federalist No. 47, at 373-74 (Hamilton ed. 1864) (Madison).
2. Wormuth, Legislative Disqualifications As Bills of Attainder, 4 Vand. L.
Rev. 603 (1951). See generally Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Con-
stitutional Law, 12 Mich. L. Rev. 247 (1914); Comment, 63 Yale L.J. 844 (1954).
3. Ibid.
4. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). See generally Davis, United
States v. Lovett and the Attainder Bogy in Modern Legislation, 1950 Wash.
U. L. Q. 13.
5. U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 9, cl. 3; 10, cl. 1. See Chafee, Three Human Rights
in the Constitution of 1787, 90-91 (1956).
6. See generally Comment, supra note 2.
7. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
8. Immigration & Nationality Act § 241 (a), 66 Stat. 204-08 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a) (1953).
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the deportation of an alien and severance of his Social Security ben-
efits. The majority held that such action was not punishment and
therefore not in conflict with the Constitution.
Defining a bill of attainder very broadly as "a legislative act
which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial,"9 an attempt will
be made to determine the particular elements of such a bill as dis-
closed by the cases and the present efficacy of the prohibition.
I. ENGLISH AND COLONIAL BILLS
English bills of attainder originated around 1300. They were acts
of Parliament punishing persons by exile or death, and generally
involved an attaint of the blood.10 The typical statute was directed
at named individuals or an ascertainable class designated as guilty
of some specifically unlawful act, usually criminal.
Professor Wylie H. Davis has analyzed the act which took the head
of the Earl of Strafford,- indicating the historical essentials of a bill
of attainder directed at an individual.
Named Whereas . . . [the members] . . . of the House of
Individual Commons... have.., impeached Thomas Earl of Straf-
ford of High Treason for endeavoring to subvert the
ancient and fundamental Laws and Government of His
Majesty's Realms... and to introduce an arbitrary and
tyrannical Government against the laws of the said
Recital of Kingdoms. And for exercising a tyrannous and exor-
"Criminal" bitant Power ... And likewise for having by his own
Activities Authority commanded the seating of soldiers upon His
Majesty's Subjects in Ireland against their consent to
compel them to obey his unlawful summons & orders
... and in so doing did levy war against the King... ;
And also for that he upon the unhappy dissolution of
the last Parliament did slander the House of Commons
to His Majesty....
For which he deserves to undergo the pains and for-
Declaration feitures of High Treason... All which Offenses have
of Guilt been sufficiently proved against the said Earl upon his
Impeachment [which had been withdrawn when ac-
quittal became evident].
Be it therefore enacted . . . That the said Earl of
Legislative Strafford stand and be adjudged attainted of High
Judgment Treason
and shall suffer such pains of Death and incur the
9. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866).
10. Annot., 90 L. Ed. 1267 (1945).
11. Davis, supra note 4, at 14-15.
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Punishment Forfeiture of his Goods and Chattels, Lands Tenements
& Hereditaments of any Estate of Freehold or Inheri-
tance in... England and Ireland... 12
An excellent example of an attainder directed against an ascertain-
able class is furnished by the bill against the Earl of Kildare and
others:
[T]he same attainder, judgment and conviction against the
said comforters, abettors, partakers, confederates and adherents,
shall be as though they and every of them had been specially,
singularly, and particularly named by their proper names and
surnames in the said act.13
In addition to bills of attainder, there were also bills which imposed
penalties less than death, such as forfeiture of civil rights or loss
of property. These were bills of pains and penalties. 4
Historically, the same five elements were present in both kinds of
bills. They: (1) named as their victims, individuals or an ascertain-
able class; (2) contained recitals of activities deemed reprehensible;
(3) declared the guilt of their victims; (4) imposed a legislative
judgment and verdict; and (5) prescribed the punishment.
English bills were in disrepute and had often been criticized as
antithetical to freedom and liberty of democratic process. Never-
theless, the American colonies had inherited the English type of bill
and colonial legislatures had frequently enacted such bills during
the Revolution to thwart Loyalism. The framers of the Federal
Constitution, in order to protect against impassioned legislative de-
crees of guilt and punishment, passed the prohibition against bills of
attainder without debate.16
Despite the absolute nature of the language, the courts have not
been able to agree on the scope of the restriction. American legislatures
have been far more sophisticated in their enactments than were the
early English Parliaments, and few laws have been found to be within
the prohibition. Those cases in which the attainder issue was
discussed by members of the court, however, contain certain common
elements which have influenced the decisions.
12. Attainder of Earl of Strafford, 1640, 16 Car. 1, c. 38.
13. Attainder of Earl of Kildare, 1536, 28 Hen. 8, c. 18.
14. Annot., 90 L. Ed. 1267, 1273 n.2 (1945); see Clarendon's Case (1667)
6 How.St.Tr. (Eng.) 291, wherein a bill, passed in the reign of Charles II
directed that the Earl should suffer perpetual exile and if he should be found
within the Realm after February 1, 1667, he should suffer the pains and penalties
of treason, providing, however, that if he should surrender himself for trial
before the above named date, the pains and penalties declared should be void
and of no effect.
15. Davis, supra note 4, at 16; see generally 5 Acts & Resolves of Mas-
sachusetts Bay 912 (1778); 9 Laws of Va. 463 (Hening 1821).
16. Wormuth, supra note 2.
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II. IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES
A bill of attainder is applicable only to a named individual or an
ascertainable class.17 The early English bills were candid in this
respect.18 American legislatures have been more subtle, citing their
victims by name but once since the adoption of the Constitution. 9
Almost as rare are cases in which the group affected could be deter-
mined from the act itself.
20
The first United States cases involved so-called "test oaths" and
arose out of the bitterness generated by the Civil War. Former sup-
porters of the Confederacy were excluded from various professions
by expurgatory oaths. An applicant was required to swear that he
had not participated in nor been sympathetic to the Rebel cause
before he was allowed to undertake certain activities.
Such an oath was questioned on constitutional grounds for the first
time in Cummings v. Missouri.21 A Roman Catholic priest was in-
dicted and convicted of the crime of preaching without first having
taken an oath,22 required by the Missouri constitution, that he had
17. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946).
18. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
19. Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, ch. 218, § 304, 57 Stat. 431, 450
(1943).
20. See, e.g., In re Yung Sing Hee, 36 Fed. 437 (C.C.D. Ore. 1888); Jones v.
Slick, 56 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1952) ; Comment, supra note 2, at 846.
21. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867); Mo. Const. art. II, §§ 3, 6, 9, 14 (1865)
prescribed an oath that the taker had not committed certain acts ranging from
expressions of sympathy with the Confederate cause to manifest hostility against
the Union; § 9 states:
No person shall assume the duties of any state, county, city, town, or other
office, to which he may be appointed, otherwise than by a vote of the people;
nor shall any person, after the expiration of sixty days after this con-
stitution takes effect, be permitted to practice as an attorney.., be com-
petent as a bishop, priest, deacon, minister, elder, or other clergyman
of any religious persuasion, sect, or denomination, to teach, or preach, or
solemnize marriages, unless such person shall have first taken, subscribed,
and filed said oath.
22. Mo. Const. art. II, § 6 (1865) sets forth the oath:
I, A. B., do solemnly swear that I am well acquainted with the terms of the
third section of the second article of the constitution of the State of
Missouri, adopted in the year eighteen hundred and sixty-five, and have
carefully considered the same; that I have never directly, or indirectly,
done any of the acts in said section specified; that I have always been truly
and loyally on the side of the United States against all enemies thereof,
foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the
United States, and will support the constitution and laws thereof as the
supreme law of the land, any law or ordinance of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding; that I will to the best of my ability protect and defend
the Union of the United States, and not allow the same to be broken up and
dissolved, or the government thereof to be destroyed or overthrown, under
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss4/5
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not been sympathetic to the Confederate cause nor openly opposed to
the Union. Cummings was fined and imprisoned pending payment.23
The decision was reversed by the United States Supreme Court in
a five to four decision. Mr. Justice Field speaking for the majority
hypothesized two extreme situations: first, a declaration of guilt by
name; second, a declaration that all priests and clergymen either
were guilty of armed hostility toward the Union or were sympathetic
to the Confederate cause. He noted that either of these extremes
would have come within the Federal constitutional prohibition.24 In
his attempt to preserve the traditional concept of bills of attainder,2
Field stated, "the existing clauses [in the Missouri Constitution]
presume the guilt of the priests and clergymen, and adjudge the
deprivation of their right to preach or teach unless the presumption
be first removed by their expurgatory oath-in other words, they
assume the guilt and adjudge the punishment conditionally." 2 While
Field's hypotheticals declared the guilt outright, the Missouri amend-
ment silently assumed guilt. In any case, the parties were certainly
denied a right or privilege either directly or indirectly. Resorting to
the ancient maxim, that what cannot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly, Field declared that the legal result of both kinds of legisla-
tion was identical. The framers of the Constitution prohibited
punishment by legislative determination. The prohibition cannot be
evaded by the form of legislation, and to declare otherwise would
make its insertion a vain and futile transaction.2 7 Thus, a legislative
act which either
declares or assumes the guilt of named individuals or an ascer-
tainable class of having committed designated acts and which
absolutely or conditionally inflicts punishment therefor, without
a trial in court, by depriving the persons affected of the right to
follow a lawful calling, is a bill of attainder within the meaning
of the Constitution.2
A similar oath, required before an attorney was admitted to practice
in the Federal courts, was invalidated in a companion case to Cum-
any circumstances, if in my power to prevent it; that I will support the
constitution of the State of Missouri; and that I make this oath without
any mental reservation or evasion, and hold it to be binding upon me.
23. Mo. Const. art. II, § 14 (1865). This section prescribes the following
penalty upon conviction for violation of these provisions: "be punished by
fine, not less than five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail
not less than six months, or by both .... "
24. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 324 (1866).
25. Davis, supra note 4, at 19.
26. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325 (1866).
27. Ibid.
28. Davis, supra note 4, at 19-20.
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mings.29 In these kinds of cases, a group (those who cannot truthfully
take the oath or who for any reason refuse to take it) is denied some
right or privilege. The mere fact that the legislature does not name
names does not mean that the statute falls outside the forbidden
area. To allow such a slight formal distinction to validate an act
which would otherwise have been invalid would be to make the
constitutional clause a nullity.
This position was reaffirmed six years later in a memorandum
decision,"° and no one has seriously questioned its validity. Instead,
the attack has been aimed at other of the requirements.
III. LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION OF GUILT 31
Mr. Justice Field defined the bill of attainder as a "legislative act
which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial."'3 2 When a legisla-
ture undertakes such an extra-curricular function, he said, it usurps
the office of the judge; asserts the guilt of the individual; disregards
the safeguards of a trial; passes on the adequacy of the evidence
produced without applying the rules of evidence; and sets the penalty
according to its own conceptions of the seriousness of the indignity.33
This traditional concept is seldom recognized by modern cases.
Even the minority in the first oath cases at least admitted the validity
of the doctrine, but argued that these oaths were not within the
historic scope of bills of attainder or bills of pains and penalties.
In his vigorous dissent 34 to both Cummings and Garland, Mr.
Justice Miller, with specific reference to Garland, stated that the
purpose of the act was to require loyalty of attorneys practicing in
the federal courts, a legitimate object of legislation. Admittedly, his
analysis of English attainders was at least as accurate historically
as the majority's, perhaps more so. But he contended that preventing
one from pursuing a chosen profession is not punishment and that
designation of an ascertainable class does not identify the parties.
Miller would have restricted the scope of the constitutional prohibition
to the English type of bill. Because in his view the act did not meet
two of the common law requirements, he found no constitutional in-
29. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
30. Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234 (1872).
31. For an excellent discussion of this matter, see The Constitutional
Prohibition of Bills of Attainder: A Waning Guaranty of Judicial Trial, 63
Yale L.J. 844, 857-61 (1954).
32. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866). (Emphasis
added.) 2 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 1344 (5th ed., Bigelow
1891).
33. Cummings v. Missouri, supra note 32, at 328-29.
34. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 385 (1866).
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firmity. Referring to the federal statute, he argued that Congress
did not declare anybody guilty of anything at all, saying:
If by any possibility it [the act of Congress] can be said to
provide [italics by the Court] for conviction and sentence, though
not found in the act itself, it leaves the party himself to determine
his own guilt or innocence, and pronounce his own sentence. It
is not, then, the act of Congress, but the party interested, that
tries and condemns.3 5
The fallacy in the argument is that the lawmakers have pointed
to a group-those who either cannot truthfully take the oath or who
will not take it, for whatever reason-declared them guilty of mis-
behavior, and provided a penalty. The prohibition is directed against
just this sort of thing, said the majority. The Constitution intends
that pronouncements of guilt be made only by the judiciary after the
accused has been given a trial under closely circumscribed procedures.
These statutes did more than accuse: they condemned all those engag-
ing in the designated activities without having taken the oath. Every
criminal statute declares a class-its violators-guilty of a crime.
But determination of guilt and identification of parties eventually
must be a court function if the act is to be unobjectionable.
A convicted felon, for example, may be denied certain rights and
there will be no bill of attainder if the denial is based ultimately
upon a judicial finding of guilt in the original prosecution. 0 It is a
completely different matter to forbid the exercise of certain rights
whenever one cannot truthfully take an expurgatory oath. Two
modern cases have completely overlooked this point,37 and have held
that requirements of oaths pertaining to present conduct38 or to past
conduct which the actor knew was subversive (even though such
conduct was insufficient to support a criminal charge) 3 are not bills
of attainder.
IV. PROSPECTIVITY
Mr. Justice Field in Cummings noted that the oath was "without
any precedent '40 and "retrospective."' 41 He compared the Missouri
oath to those familiar in England and France which "were always
limited to an affirmation of present belief, or present disposition
35. Id. at 390. (Emphasis added.)
36. See, e.g., Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
37. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); American Com-
munications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
38. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, supra note 37.
39. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951). See also Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections,
341 U.S. 56 (1951).
40. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 318 (1866).
41. Ibid.
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towards the government, and were never exacted with reference to
particular instances of past misconduct." 42 It was the retrospective
feature of the Missouri oath which made it peculiar to this country.
The use of this language was unfortunate, since its implication is
that bills which on their faces appear to be attainders will not be
unconstitutional if they operate only prospectively. Field was, it
seems clear, attempting two things not wholly compatible. He wanted
first to invalidate the test oaths as bills of attainder, but he wanted
to do this within the historic framework of the standardized English
bills. Although the oaths common in England and France did indeed,
we may assume, exact swearings as to present beliefs, the language
of the Cummings decision seems to state that bills of attainder always
operate only against past conduct. This is not true historically,43
and there is no reason why it ought to be true since the real objection
to such bills is how they operate rather than the conduct they operate
against. Indications are, however, that the Supreme Court presently
believes that only retrospective bills can be attainders.4 4 Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, concurring in United States v. Lovett,45 took a very
narrow view of bills of attainder, rigidly insisting that they follow
the format of the English bills and contain an outright specification
of the offense charged and an explicit finding of guilt. These elements
would never be found in any bill operating on future conduct. It is
doubtful if the issue will ever be entirely decisive since too many other
possible arguments may be made. Yet in view of the tendency to
restrict constitutional limitations in favor of expanded governmental
control, it is more difficult to foresee a contrary holding.
V. PUNISHMENT V. QUALIFICATION
With the decisions in Cummings and Garland, it was settled that
the prohibition against attainders included bills of pains and penalties,
and that the punishment imposed need not be penal.46 Further clar-
42. Ibid.
43. Davis, supra note 4, at 41.
44. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 413-14 (1950).
45. 328 U.S. 303, 321-23 (1946).
46. In this respect, at least, bills of attainder differ from ex post facto laws.
The prohibition against ex post facto laws applies to any law assessing a
criminal penalty for acts done in the past which were not forbidden when done.
Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924). The classic definition of ex post facto
laws was stated by Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390
(1798):
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law,
and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.
2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was,
when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts
a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss4/5
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ification of this aspect of attainders is found in United States v.
Lovett,'4 where it was held that a permanent ban from government
service constituted punishment. Thus the permanent withdrawal of
the privileges of citizenship may be a form of punishment.
This is not to say that reasonable qualifications cannot be prescribed
for certain professions or positions. Even the Constitution recognizes
the desirability and utility of setting standards for positions of great
trust, confidence or public interest.48 The distinction between legiti-
mate standards and unreasonable, unconstitutional attaints is not
always easy to draw, although two methods of setting standards are
acceptable. If the qualifying standards may, in theory, be reached by
anyone, there is no bill of attainder.49 If a presently existing dis-
4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission
of the offense, in order to convict the offender.
It is probable that the fourth type of statute listed by Justice Chase would be
called procedural today and not within the constitutional proscription. See
Moore v. State, 43 N.J.L. 203, 216 (Ct. Err. & App. 1881). The other three types
remain firmly rooted in the law, presenting only problems of interpretation in
individual cases.
A particularly troublesome area, for example, is a change in punishment. Of
course, laws which reduce a punishment are not forbidden, Rooney v. North
Dakota, 196 U.S. 319 (1905), nor are laws which substitute one kind of punish-
ment for another so long as they are equivalent, State v. Kent, 65 N.C. 311
(1871). But when a punishment is increased, the courts will examine the standard
prescribed by the legislature rather than the sentence actually imposed by a
trial court. E.g., Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937); Ex parte Medley,
134 U.S. 160 (1890). The punishment fixed at the time of commission of the act
is the maximum which may be decreed for that particular violation. United
States v. Papworth, 156 F. Supp. 842 (N.D. Tex. 1957). Further difficulties are
encountered when determining what is punishment. It was held in Mahler v.
Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924) that deportation of an alien was not punishment within
the constitutional mandate. Certainly any sanctions expressly designated as
criminal will fall within the prohibition, but oftentimes such designations are
not clearly made. If the penalty is interpreted as being only civil, Frazier v.
Goddard, 63 F. Supp. 696 (E.D. Okla. 1945), or even only quasi-criminal, State
v. Hughes, 8 S.D. 338, 66 N.W. 1076 (1896), it is not forbidden by the injunction
against ex post facto laws.
47. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
48. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
49. See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) (a West Virginia
statute required every practitioner of medicine to obtain a certificate from the
State Board of Health indicating that he was a graduate of a reputable medical
school, or had successfully practiced medicine in the state for ten years, or that
he had been found qualified to practice medicine based on the successful comple-
tion of an examination. The act was upheld as a reasonable attempt to secure
skill in the profession of medicine). See also Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S.
189 (1898) (Statute making any convicted felon attempting to practice medicine
guilty of a misdemeanor upheld).
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qualification may be removed by the voluntary act of the disqualified
party, there is no bill of attainder.
Neither the Cummings nor the Garland oath fell into either cate-
gory, the court said. The deprivation was for past acts-if a party
had ever, at any time, supported the Confederacy, he could neither
attain the standard prescribed nor avoid the disqualification.
A. Failure to Meet the Standard"
The Court in Cummings"l held that disqualification from a legiti-
mate occupation, from positions of confidence, from practice in the
courts, or from service as executor, administrator or guardian
is punishment.
How, then, did the Missouri constitution 2 punish Reverend Cum-
mings? While acknowledging that the state may prescribe qualifica-
tions for holding office or engaging in certain professions, Field
observed that "it by no means follows that, under the form of creat-
ing a qualification ... the States can in effect inflict a punishment
for a past act which was not punishable at the time it was commit-
ted."5.3
On the other hand, if the standard is reasonable and is in theory
attainable by every one, there is no punishment and no bill of
attainder. The establishment of standards which might be reached
by all diligent and skilled persons seems to be clearly within the
domain of legislative power. The interest of society is protection
from charlatans, frauds and clods, or from good-intentioned but
unschooled practitioners of an art. The best example of an attainable,
non-attainting standard is discussed in Dent v. West Virginia,"4 in-
volving the licensing of physicans.
B. Past Disqualifications Which Cannot Be Removed-
The Garland Case
The other prominent test oath case, Ex parte Garland,5" was de-
cided the same day as Cummings, and had a similar background. In
1862,56 Congress prescribed an oath57 required of all elected and ap-
50. This area has been discussed very ably, with an excellent analysis. Com-
ment, supra note 2, at 850-55.
51. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
52. Mo. Const. art. II, §§ 3, 6, 9, 14 (1865).
53. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 319 (1866).
54. 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
55. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
56. An Act to prescribe an Oath of Office, and for other Purposes, 12 Stat.
502 (1862).
57. The oath is as follows:
I, A. B., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have never voluntarily borne
arms against the United States since I have been a citizen thereof; that I
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss4/5
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pointed officers of the United States save only the President. In 1865
Congress passed a supplementary act extending the oath to attorneys
applying for admission to practice in the Federal courts. False
taking of the oath again rendered the person guilty of perjury upon
conviction and barred him from ever holding a United States' office.
At the December term, 1860, Garland had been admitted to practice
in the Federal courts. In March 1865 the oath became a requirement
for continued qualification."9 Garland, having served as representa-
tive and later as Senator from Arkansas in the Congress of the Con-
federacy, was prohibited from taking the oath under penalty of
perjury.
In July 1865 Garland was given a full pardon by the President. So
armed, he petitioned the courts for permission to continue practicing
in Federal courts without taking the oath.60 He argued that the act
of 186561 was unconstitutional as a bill of attainder, or, if constitu-
tional, was not applicable to him because of his presidential pardon.0 -
Again, Field spoke for the majority. In a brief opinion he declared
that the oath operated as a decree of perpetual exclusion.03 He em-
phasized that disqualification from a profession for past conduct must
be regarded as punishment. Field did not deny the power of the
legislature to prescribe qualifications in the public interest but stated
that the sanction imposed must have some reasonable relationship to
the qualification. Since no such relationship appeared, the oath re-
quirement was invalidated.
Here was a case where, having once acted, a party was truly
attainted. Nothing he could do, nothing which could be done for him,
including a presidential pardon, could ever open the pathway blocked
have voluntarily given no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to
persons engaged in armed hostility thereto; that I have neither sought nor
accepted, nor attempted to exercise the functions of any office whatever,
under any authority or pretended authority in hostility to the United
States; that I have not yielded a voluntary support to any pretended
government, authority, power or constitution within the United States,
hostile or inimical thereto. And I do further swear (or affirm) that, to
the best of my knowledge and ability, I will support and defend the Con-
stitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic;
that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this
obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion,
and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on
which I am about to enter, so help me God....
58. Act of Jan. 24, 1865, 13 Stat. 424 (1865).
59. Ibid.
60. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
61. Act of Jan. 24, 1865, 13 Stat. 424 (1865).
62. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
63. Ibid.
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by the legislature. Being immovable, the barrier differs materially
from a barrier caused by failure to persevere in pursuing a skill,
serving an apprenticeship or attaining a physical maturity as deter-
mined by age.
C. Denial of a Privilege
Unlike the ex post facto law, bills of attainder need not impose a
criminal penalty.14 It has been said that denials of a privilege may
constitute punishment and, where the other requirements of an
attainder are met, will be invalid. United States v. Lovett,65 the case
usually cited for this proposition, may not, however, be good authority
for such a broad statement. The Lovett case is unique insofar as it
involved the only instance in post-Revolutionary America where the
legislature was so tactless and direct as to name its victims. Between
the last test oath case66 and Lovett, seventy-four years had passed
and many cases had been decided by the lower Federal and state
courts expounding the bill of attainder doctrine, some striking down
the statute in question,67 some upholding it.68 Then came Lovett, and
64. See note 46 supra.
65. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
66. Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234 (1872).
67. See, e.g., Putty v. United States, 220 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 821 (1955) (federal statute which barred an attack upon a
conviction which had been proceeded against accused by way of information
rather than indictment); Davis v. Berry, 216 Fed. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914), rev'd
on other grounds, 242 U.S. 468 (1917) (act which authorized the performance
of a vasectomy operation on mental and physical degenerates and those twice
convicted of a felony was held to be punishment for a past act); Steinberg v.
United States, 163 F. Supp. 590 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (federal statute which barred
payment of any annuity or retirement pay, based on federal service, to one
who refused on the ground of self-incrimination to appear, testify, or produce
any document with respect to his federal service or other government service);
Johnson v. United States, 111 Ct. Cl. 750, 79 F. Supp. 208 (1948) (Madden, J.,
concurring) (federal statute barring payments to a retired federal judge, who
renounced all rights to receive such payments following a congressional in-
vestigation resulting in condemnation of his activities while on the bench); cf.
Skinner v. State ex rel. Williamson, 189 Okla. 235, 115 P.2d 123 (1941) (Habitual
Criminal Sterilization Act was held to be eugenic and not intended as further
punishment of the felonious multiple offender. The United States Supreme Court
held the act unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection of the laws in that
the act applied to those twice convicted of larceny but not embezzlement, and
both were felonies. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
See also, In re Yung Sing Hee, 36 Fed. 437 (C.C.D. Ore. 1888) (the Chinese
Exclusion Act was held unconstitutional as a bill of attainder in that it in-
flicted punishment expressly because of race); McNealy v. Gregory, 13 Fla. 417
(1870) (a provision in the Florida Constitution which invalidated all judgments
and decrees of state courts in any action based on the sale or purchase of slaves);
Burkett v. McCarty, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 758 (1866) (the Kentucky Expatriation
Act of 1862 deprived all persons of their state citizenship for participating in
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seemingly the attainder prohibition was expanded beyond what many
felt were its historical and constitutional bounds.61 Whether the
secession and required a test oath as a condition to voting); Gaines v. Buford,
31 Ky. (1 Dana) 481 (1833) (forfeiture of land to the Commonwealth unless
certain improvements were made to the land); State ex rel. Pittman v. Adams,
44 Mo. 570 (1869) (legislation requiring a loyalty oath for a college board of
curators was lawfully enacted, but a declaration removing the curators from the
board for not taking the oath was an attainder); The Murphy & Glover Test
Oath Cases, 41 Mo. 339 (1867) (involving the same constitutional provision
invalidated by the Supreme Court in Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
277 (1867) but applied to attorneys; and as to teachers, State v. Heighland,
41 Mo. 388 (1867); Green v. Shumway, 39 N.Y. 418, 36 How. Pr. 5 (Ct. App.
1868) (loyalty oath required of electors of delegates to the State Constitutional
Amendment Convention); Kyle v. Jenkins, 6 W. Va. 371 (1873) (statute re-
quiring filing of a suitor's test oath along with petitions for a rehearing). But
cf. Boyd v. Mills, 53 Kan. 594, 37 Pac. 16 (1894) (Kansas constitutional provi-
sion disqualified those who aided the Confederacy from voting or holding public
office until said disability was removed by 2/3's vote of the legislature).
68. See, e.g., Drehman v. Stifle, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 595 (1869) (Missouri Con-
stitutional provision which exempted individuals from civil liability for property
damage done while acting under military authority); Communist Party of
United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 223 F.2d 531 (1955),
rev'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 115 (1955) (Subversive Activities Control Act
of 1950); Quattrone v. Nicolls, 210 F.2d 513 (1st Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 976 (1954) (deportation, however severe, is not punishment); Dodez v.
United States, 154 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1946), rev'd on other grounds, 328 U.S.
828 (1946) (upheld Selective Service Act of 1940 denying intermediate judicial
review of local draft board classification); Story v. Rives, 97 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir.
1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 595 (1938) (upheld act of Congress which required
parole violators to be returned to prison to serve the remainder of their original
sentence); Fougherouse v. Brownell, 163 F. Supp. 580 (D. Ore. 1958) (Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952); United States v. Stein, 140 F. Supp. 761
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (application of Smith Act as amended by Communist Control
Act of 1954); United States v. Kuzma, 141 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. Pa. 1954) (section
2 of Smith Act which provided for criminal punishment of persons conspiring to
overthrow government of United States by force and violence); Goodin v.
Clinchfield R.R., 125 F. Supp. 441 (E.D. Tenn. 1954), aff'd, 229 F.2d 578 (6th
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 953 (1955) (pursuant to Railway Labor Act,
a collective bargaining contract whereby contracting parties adopted age 70 as
compulsory retirement age); Simmons v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 641
(M.D. Pa. 1954) (National Service Life Insurance provision excluded payments
on any death inflicted as legal sanction); American Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 110 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd 347 U.S. 284 (1953) (F.C.C. rule
providing for denial of or revocation of license for violation of Commission
rules); Peer v. Skeen, 108 F. Supp. 921 (N.D. W. Va. 1952), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 930 (1952) (Habitual Criminal Statute which increased punishment of
habitual offenders); Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952) (federal
statute granting discretionary authority to Secretary of State concerning issuance
of or withdrawal of passports); Washington v. Clark, 84 F. Supp. 964 (D.D.C.
1949), aff'd sub nom. Washington v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 923 (1949) (President's
Loyalty Orders establishing procedure for removal from government those service
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Lovett decision, good or bad, is still the law can best be considered
by comparing it with the most recent case, Flemming v. Nestor.70
VI. UNITED STATES V. LOVETT
In 1943, Representative Dies in a passionate speech to the House
attacked 39 government employees as "radical bureaucrats" and as-
sociates of "Communist front organizations. 71 Among those attacked
were Robert M. Lovett, Goodwin B. Watson, and William E. Dodd, Jr.
A subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee was appointed to
employees classified as security risks); United States ex rel. Lubbers v. Reimer,
22 F. Supp. 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) (determination by an administrative board
regarding an alien's deportability) ; French v. Senate, 146 Cal. 604, 80 Pac. 1031
(1905) (Senate resolution expelling a member for accepting a bribe); People
v. Camperlingo, 69 Cal. App. 466, 231 Pac. 601 (1924) (statute imposing penalty
for possession of a pistol by one having been convicted of a felony); Davis v.
City of Savannah, 147 Ga. 605, 95 S.E. 6 (1918) (city ordinance which re-
stricted area in which cattle could be kept within the city which resulted in the
revocation of licenses issued to some dairymen); Gray v. McLendon, 134 Ga.
224, 67 S.E. 859 (1910) (act providing for appointment of a railroad commis-
sioner by the governor, which reserved to the Legislature the right to remove
him from office after his suspension by the governor); Shepherd v. Grimmett,
2 Idaho 1123, 31 Pac. 793 (1892) (test oath for voters directed primarily against
plural marriages); Wooley v. Watkins, 2 Idaho 590, 22 Pac. 102 (1889) (act of
Congress denying polygamists the right to vote); People v. Lawrence, 390 Ill.
499, 61 N.E.2d 361 (1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 808 (1945) (Habitual Criminal
Act which automatically increased punishment of those with a record of prior
convictions); Crampton v. O'Mara, 193 Ind. 551, 139 N.E. 360 (1923), appeal
dismissed, 267 U.S. 575 (1925) (statute which prohibited one convicted of an
infamous crime from holding public office); Moore v. Commonwealth, 293 Ky. 55,
168 S.W.2d 342 (1943) (act which caused property to be forfeited if knowingly
used for the purpose of selling liquor in a dry territory); Mosher v. Bay Circuit
Judge, 108 Mich. 503, 66 N.W. 384 (1896) (act authorized the issuance of
attachment on a claim not due); State v. Graves, 352 Mo. 1102, 182 S.W.2d 46
(1944) (statute requiring accused to answer relevant questions pertaining to
convictions for impeachment purposes if he chose to take the stand); In re
Platz, 60 Nev. 296, 108 P.2d 858 (1940) (statute restricting the practice of law
to dues paying members of the bar); France v. State, 57 Ohio St. 1, 47 N.E.
1041 (1897) (act which regulated the practice of medicine by creating an ad-
ministrative board to pass on qualifications of those desirous of practicing within
the state) ; Kelley v. State Bar, 148 Okla. 282, 298 Pac. 623 (1931) (requirement
that attorneys pay reasonable annual dues under penalty of disbarment); Davis
v. Beeler, 185 Tenn. 638, 207 S.W.2d 343 (1947) (statute prohibiting the practice
of naturopathy within the state and repealed a prior statute); State v. Coubal,
248 Wis. 247, 21 N.W.2d 381 (1946) (statute providing for the revocation of
the liquor license of any person convicted of permitting gambling on his
premises).
69. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 318 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring opinion).
70. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
71. 89 Cong. Rec. 474, 479, 480, 483 (1943) (remarks of Congressman Dies).
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investigate the charges made by Congressman Dies. Hearings were
held in secret executive session at which the accused were not per-
mitted counsel. The committee found Lovett, Watson and Dodd
"guilty" of "subversive activity."72 As a result of this finding, Con-
gress added a rider to Section 30473 of the Urgent Deficiency Appro-
priation Act of 1943.74 The rider provided that no part of any
appropriation "which is now, or which is hereafter made, available
... shall be used, after November 15, 1943, to pay any part of the
salary.. .,75 of Lovett, Watson and Dodd, unless they were first re-
appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. President
Roosevelt signed the bill. While he objected to the rider, he was unable
to veto it without rejecting the entire appropriation bill, which would
have jeopardized our war effort.7 6
The agencies employing the three named individuals kept them at
their jobs after the deadline, but they received no pay. They then
sued in the Court of Claims for compensation for work performed
after November 15, 1943.77 Judgment for the petitioners was affirmed
by the United States Supreme Court.78
In the Supreme Court, respondents urged that Section 304 was an
infringement on the executive removal power, which is not entrusted
72. H.R. Rep. No. 448, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1943).
73. The rider is as follows:
No part of any appropriation, allocation, or fund (1) which is made avail-
able under or pursuant to this Act, or (2) which is now, or which is
hereafter made, available under or pursuant to any other Act, to any depart-
ment, agency, or instrumentality of the United States, shall be used, after
November 15, 1943, to pay any part of the salary, or other compensation
for the personal services, of Goodwin B. Watson, William E. Dodd, Junior,
and Robert Morss Lovett, unless prior to such date such person has been
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate:
Provided, That this section shall not operate to deprive any such person
of payment for leaves of absence or salary, or of any refund or reimburse-
ment, which have accrued prior to November 15, 1943:
Provided further, That this section shall not operate to deprive any such
person of payment for services performed as a member of a jury or as a
member of the armed forces of the United States nor any benefit, pension,
or emolument resulting therefrom.
74. Ch. 218, § 304, 57 Stat. 431, 450 (1943).
75. Ibid. The entire amendment is quoted supra note 73.
76. H.R. Doe. No. 264, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943).
77. Lovett v. United States, 104 Ct. Cl. 557, 66 F. Supp. 142 (1943). The
members of the court were split as to the reasons but agreed that Messrs.
Lovett, Dodd, and Goodwin were entitled to compensation.
78. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
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to Congress ;79 a bill of attainder;80 and a violation of due process.,,
The Court held Section 304 unconstitutional as a bill of attainder.
Historically, bills of attainder had to declare on their faces that
the individual or class was guilty of some designated misbehavior.
Section 304 lacked this traditional requirement. It simply prohibited
any disbursement of current or future appropriations for the salary
of any of the respondents. While the rider did not command that the
parties be removed from their jobs, it did accomplish this unless
one is willing to assume that the parties would continue working
without compensation.
Mr. Justice Black delivered the majority opinion.8 2 That declara-
tions of guilt did not appear on the face of the legislation did not
concern him. Relying on House debates and Committee reports, Black
found declarations of guilt and an intent to punish. The majority
adopted the Cummings and Garland definition of attainder and de-
cided that Section 304 punished the named individuals without the
protection of a judicial trial. They did not distinguish between
criminal sanctions, salary severance or loss of a job as punishment.
Citing Garland, Mr. Justice Black declared that Section 304 "operated
as a legislative decree of perpetual exclusion"8 3 from further govern-
ment employment.
After Lovett, it seemed clear that a bill of attainder is legislation
which names an individual or an ascertainable class with intent to
punish. The crucial test is not the nature of the sanction imposed but
the motive behind its imposition. Intent to punish may be evidenced
by its presence on the face of the document or from punitive language
contained in committee records and Congressional reports, 4 as may
declarations of guilt. The punishment requirement encompassed
legislative enactments resulting in perpetual exclusion from one's
79. U.S. Const. art. II. §§ 1, 2, 3, 4.
80. U.S. Const. art. I. § 9, cl. 3.
81. Many seemingly feel that the case would have been more appropriately
decided on this point. See Davis, United States v. Lovett and The Attainder
Bogy in Modern Legislation, 1950 Wash. U.L.Q. 13, 44-45 & n.92. The court
first had to decide whether § 304 was a "mere appropriation measure" and
therefore non-justiciable.
82. The vote was 8-0 in favor of affirmance. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote
a concurring opinion declaring that respondents should be paid but that Section
304 was valid because it did no more than cut off regular disbursal of payments.
Relying on Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288 (1936) he avoided the constitu-
tional question.
83. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946).
84. Note, Punishment: Its Meaning in Relation to Separation of Power and
Substantive Constitutional Restrictions and Its Use in the Lovett, Trop, Perez,
and Speiser Cases, 34 Ind. L.J. 231 (1959); Comment, The Communist Control
Act of 1954, 64 Yale L.J. 712 (1955).
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vocation, and was not restricted to the imposition of criminal sanc-
tions.
In his concurring opinion,85 Mr. Justice Frankfurter refused to
decide the case on the constitutional issues, but nonetheless discussed
them at length. He argued that courts should construe all laws so
that their constitutionality is not questioned, if such a construction is
possible. While it may be argued that Frankfurter's interpretation
of Section 304 is far from reasonable, our concern here is with his
discussion of bills of attainder.
Frankfurter stated that two kinds of constitutional questions ap-
pear before the Supreme Court, one requiring an exercise of legal
judgment because the issue involves a broad standard such as "due
process," the other allowing no lee-way since the constitutional pro-
hibition is specific. The prohibition against bills of attainder is
specific, he notes,88 and leaves no room for judicial definition or
extension. In his view the English type of bill is the only kind for-
bidden. Since the usual English bill contained an explicit declaration
of guilt and prescribed a specific punishment, any act lacking these
characteristics is, perforce, not within the prohibition. No amount
of research into legislative history or delving into Congressional
motives can invalidate a bill valid on its face. In other words, where
Black is willing to examine the background of the questioned legisla-
tion, Frankfurter narrows his view and confines it to the text of the
act itself. Not only does he assert that he will avoid deciding the
issue if he can, he further tells Congress how to word a bill so that
it is valid on the basis of its language alone.
VII. THE INTERIM CASES
The limited impact of Lovett is demonstrated by the fact that
subsequent cases involving laws which looked like bills of attainder
were decided on other grounds.
Example I
In United Public Workers v. Mitchell"7 the constitutionality of Sec-
tions 9 and 9A of the Hatch Act"" was questioned. These sections
forbade persons employed in the executive branch of the Federal
85. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 318 (1946).
86. Id. at 321. This is rather an unusual statement for a man who so avidly
espouses the "balancing of interests" test for alleged violations of the first amend-
ment, the language of which is at least as specific as that of the bill of attainder
prohibition. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951) (concurring
opinion).
87. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
88. An Act to prevent pernicious political activities, 53 Stat. 1147, 1148
(1939), 5 U.S.C. § 118(5) (Supp. 1948).
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government from actively participating in political campaigns. Per-
sons violating the act were to be immediately discharged from govern-
ment service and permanently banned from re-employment in the
same position. The Hatch Act was upheld as applied to a roller
employee in the United States mint who, during his off time, was a
ward committeeman. Section 9A looks, on it face, like a bill of
attainder. It identifies an ascertainable class (government employ-
ees), prohibits designated conduct (active participation in political
campaigns), and sets out punishment for violation of its provisions
(upon a determination by the United States Civil Service Commission
that the employee has violated the act, he is removed from his position
and permanently banned from re-employment in that same position).
This case indicated the court's dilemma in separating cases where the
intent is to punish from those where Congress has prescribed rea-
sonable qualifications for office with a view toward efficient govern-
mental operation. 89 The attainder issue was not argued, as the
parties seemingly were satisfied to base their challenge on the first
amendment. Section 9A was upheld as violating neither the first
amendment nor the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
This decision clouds the attainder issue since one is hard pressed
to think of legislation not violative of due process but unconstitutional
as a bill of attainder.
Example II
On appeal from a decision of the supreme court of Oklahoma
upholding the validity of a state loyalty oath,90 the Supreme Court,
in Wiemcn v. Updegraff,9' reversed on the ground that the oath
violated due process. The appellants particularly objected to having
to swear "that within the five years immediately preceding the taking
of the oath ... I have not been a member of... any agency..."92
on the Attorney General's list. While agreeing with the majority
that the due process clause was violated, Mr. Justice Black in a con-
curring opinion declared that the statute was also a bill of attainder,
since it punished for past lawful associations and utterances.93
89. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
90. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 51 § 37.1-37.8 (Supp. 1952).
91. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
92. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl.5.
93. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 193 (1952). The court distinguished
this case from Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951), which
upheld a California loyalty oath on the assumption that scienter was implicit
in each clause of the oath. They did not make this assumption in the Wieman
case. Accord, Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) (suspension of
medical license for failure to produce certain documents before a Congressional
committee upheld); Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1932) (requiring
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Example III
The constitutionality of the Immigration and Nationality Act"'
was challenged in Trop v. Dulles."- The act prescribed loss of citizen-
ship for all persons dishonorably discharged for desertion from the
Army during wartime. The majority concluded that this amounted
to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment. On the question of bills of attainder, the court stated that the
prohibition applied only to penal laws. They defined a penal law as
a statute which "imposes a disability for the purposes of punishment
-that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer... .",,6 A law may be non-
penal even though it imposes a disability if it accomplishes a legiti-
mate governmental purpose. The "evident purpose of the legislature"' 1
controls in any given situation.
VIII. FLEMMING V. NESTOR""
Flemming v. Nestor"0 involved a resident alien. From December
1936 until January 1955 he and his employer made regular contribu-
tions for Social Security insurance in accordance with the Federal
Insurance Contributions Act.10
Nestor had been a member of the Communist Party from 1933
until 1939, when membership was not illegal and was not a ground
for deportation. In 1952 Congress passed a law providing that any-
teaching applicant to take an oath that he is not a member of a "subversive"
group upheld); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 66 (1951)
(non-subversive test oath requirement for candidates for public office upheld);
cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (California law requiring veterans
to take a loyalty oath as a condition precedent to being allowed to take tax
exemptions declared unconstitutional); American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (loyalty oath as a condition precedent to serving
as a union officer upheld).
94. 66 Stat. 163 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1958), as
amended, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1486 (Supp. II, 1959-60). The court was particularly
concerned with 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) 8 (1958).
95. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). In Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), the court
sustained expatriation imposed as a result of voting in a foreign election, under
Section 401(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, (54 Stat. 1137 (1940),
as amended, 8 U.S.C. 1481(5). Such denationalization was a result of voluntary
conduct and a lawful sanction imposed by Congress in an attempt to regulate
foreign relations.
96. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958).
97. Ibid.
98. The make-up of the court had changed considerably since the Lovett
decision (1946). Gone were Justices Stone, Rutledge, Murphy, Reed, Burton
and Jackson.
99. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
100. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 3101-25.
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one deported because of membership in the Communist Party T1 '
would cease to receive Social Security benefits.' 0 2 Nestor was deported
in 1956 and his Social Security benefit payments stopped.
The trial court'0 3 rendered summary judgment for Nestor. The
decision was reversed by the Supreme Court. The case involved
three questions: (1) whether Section 212 (n) of the Social Security
Act deprived Nestor of an accrued property right; (2) whether the
Act was arbitrary and unreasonable in violation of the fifth amend-
ment; and (3) whether Section 202 (n) was a bill of attainder. In a
5-4 decision, the majority answered all three questions in the negative.
We are concerned only with the attainder issue.
The Court concluded that the act was intended only to regulate the
Social Security system, and that where legislation is aimed at an
activity rather than at a person or class of persons, any resulting
disability to persons or classes is not punishment.0 4
A bill of attainder is always designed to punish. Two tests have been
formulated to expose any punitive intent. One, stated by Mr.
Justice Black in the Lovett case, permits the examination of reports
and debates in search of motives. The other test, taken directly from
the Garland case, requires that any disqualification imposed must
be based on some trait which would preclude the disqualified party
from functioning properly in the position he seeks. This has been
appropriately termed the relevancy test.0 5 The majority declared
that their duty was to determine whether the legislature intended to
punish for past conduct or whether the harm to the individual was
merely incidental to the regulation of an activity.
101. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a) (6) (C) (i) 66 Stat. 163, 204
(1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6)(C)(i) (1954). Paragraphs (1), (2), and (10)
of § 241 (a) relate to unlawful entry, or entry not in compliance with certain
conditions; paragraphs (6) and (7) apply to subversive activities; the remainder
of the included paragraphs are concerned with convictions or related activities
of designated crimes. See note 106 infra for a list of the four classes which are
grounds for deportation but are not included in § 202 (n) of the Social Security
Act.
102. Social Security Act § 202(n), 68 Stat. 1083 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 402(n)
(1954):
(n) . . . (1) If any individual is (after the date of enactment . .
deported under paragraph (1), (2), (4), (5), (6), (7), (10), (11), (12),
(14), (15), (16), (17), or (18) of section 241 (a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, then, not withstanding any other provisions of this title-
"(A) no monthly benefit under this section shall be paid to such in-
dividual, on the basis of his wages and self-employment income, for any
month occurring (i) after the month in which the Secretary is notified
by the Attorney General that such individual has been so deported. ..
103. Nestor v. Folsom, 169 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1959).
104. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
105. Note, supra note 84.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss4/5
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Nestor argued that the legislation was designed to punisk aliens
deported for certain reasons. He attempted to support this claim
by pointing out that four grounds for the deportation of aliens
set out in Section 241 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
were not included in Section 202 (n) of the Social Security Act.100
Persons deported under those four sections would continue to receive
benefits after they had been deported. After reviewing the House re-
ports, the Court concluded that there was no evidence that the legisla-
tion was designed to punish,107 and decided further that the act was
necessary for the regulation of the Social Security system. Congress
was concerned with the fact of deportation, it said, and not the
grounds for the deportation itself. The Court concluded that denial
of a non-contractual government benefit to certain deportees bore a
rational relationship to the purpose of the legislation. The majority
relied on earlier cases in deciding that deportation per se was not
punishment, and was a legitimate exercise of the Congressional power
to establish conditions under which aliens might remain in this
country.108
Mr. Justice Black dissented,109 along with the Chief Justice, Justice
Douglas and Justice Brennan. Black declared that the Cummings, Gar-
106. The four classes not included in § 202(n) are: 1) mentally diseased
persons institutionalized within five years of entry, 2) persons becoming public
charges within five years from causes in existence prior to entry, 3) non-
immigrants who are admitted as such but do not comply with the conditions of
entry, 4) those who knowingly and for gain aid another alien to enter unlaw-
fully.
107. H.R. Rep. No. 2679, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1954).
108. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (alien deported as having been a
member of the Communist party); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938)
(deportation of aliens is a remedial sanction free of the punitive criminal ele-
ment); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924) (deportation while it may burden the
alien, is not a punishment); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913) (de-
portation of alien prostitutes-Mr. Justice Holmes at 591 said, "It is thoroughly
established that Congress has the power to order the deportation of aliens whose
presence in the country it deems hurtful."). For the other side of the coin
read Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580
(1952).
109. Mr. Justice Black also urged a strong dissent on bill of attainder grounds
in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (the activities of the House
Un-American Committee violated the bill of attainder prohibition because the
purpose of the committee was to try witnesses and punish them because they
are or had been Communists and this is punishment inflicted without a judicial
trial. The question was not considered by the majority.) See also Uphaus v.
Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959) (Black concurring in Brennan's dissent); Galvan v.
Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (Black's dissent); Barsky v. Board of Regents,
347 U.S. 442 (1954) (Black's dissent); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (Black's separate concurring opinion with the
majority).
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land and Lovett decisions required the court to hold Section 202 (n)
a bill of attainder. He argued that deprivation of insurance benefits
was punishment since it divested the deportee of "an earned right.""
He concluded that the act was a bill of attainder even in the classic
sense, since it was legislation aimed at an ascertainable class, punish-
ing for conduct not illegal when done, without the protections of a
judicial trial.
Mr. Justice Douglas thought that the object of the enactment was
to deprive a deportee of his property because he had embraced a
certain ideology.".
Mr. Justice Brennan wrote a dissent in which the Chief Justice
joined. 12 Because Section 202 (n) applied only to aliens deported for
one of fourteen stated reasons instead of to all deported aliens,
Brennan could not be persuaded that Congress intended only to
regulate an activity."' Rather it seemed clear to him that Congress
intended to punish. He concluded that the act was invalid as an ex
post facto law, and did not decide the attainder question.
IX. THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
It is interesting to note that Frankfurter was a member of the
majority in the Flemming case, and, at least tacitly, modified the
strong position he took in Lovett. That is, he allowed Mr. Justice
Harlan, speaking for the majority, to explore (even though somewhat
superficially) the legislative history behind the act under which
Nestor lost his Social Security benefits. Admittedly, Frankfurter
may have felt that the constitutional issue should not have been
discussed. Nevertheless, his silence leaves the legal world in a
quandary. It must now face a number of possibilities when con-
sidering whether an act is a bill of attainder.
First, there is the possibility that the Flemming decision is an
example of the rather exceptional treatment to which certain persons
are subjected by reason of alleged Communist affiliations.114 This
might explain the ease with which the Flemming decision was able
to gather majority approval.
Second, there is the possibility that the opinions expressed by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Lovett have now been adopted by the Court,
and the cursory excursion into legislative history found in Flemming
represents but a slight concession to the Lovett majority. If such is
110. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
111. H.R. Rep. No. 1698, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1954).
112. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 634 (1960).
113. Id. at 637.
114. Compare Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959) with National Ass'n
for Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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the case, and if future legislators follow the suggestions of the Lovett
concurrence, the bill of attainder clause is only a dated thrust at an
eighteenth century peculiarity and no longer a meaningful part of
the Constitution. This finally settles the question of "substance versus
form," with "form" the unabashed victor.
Third, there is yet the possibility, slight though it seems, that the
attainder clause is not dead but only dormant. Unsatisfactory as the
Black approach may be, and granting that this position tends to
foster useless accumulations of needless evidence to rationalize a
decision, it does preach the lesson of history. It recognizes that as
often as men have found ways to thwart the workings of tyranny,
just so often have other men found ways to evade the barriers. There
is no guarantee that modern legislatures will not impose punishments
by devious means. There is at hand a weapon with which to cope
with any such attempts, based on the willingness, implicit in Lovett,
to expand the Constitution to meet modern problems, and built on
the "direct-indirect" language of the Cummings case. As for the
research into legislative history which Black finds necessary-what
need is there to demonstrate the obvious? If the purported bill of
attainder works a punishment and if the other definitional require-
ments are met, there is no need to search for motives. Motives are
easily disguised and more easily misread.
As Chief Justice Marshall observed, courts should always remember
that it is a constitution they are expounding, and when so doing they
should consider not only its language but its nature. "Its nature ...
requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important
objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those
objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves."11' The
nature of the bill of attainder prohibition seems clear enough, but if
the Flemming case anticipates a trend, this constitutional proscription
apparently will soon be forgotten.
115. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
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